The Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda is not the first the world has faced. But it is the first the world has faced after the Trump administration’s “America First” policy reshaped global health, making the rest of the world more vulnerable.
In 2025, the Trump administration retreated from the international community, eliminating the U.S. Agency for International Development, significantly reducing foreign assistance and withdrawing from the World Health Organization. Those moves deprived the global health system of critical support it had long relied on, creating conditions that have made an effective response to the deadly outbreak more challenging, current and former aid workers told MS NOW.
For decades, USAID worked with local partners and international nongovernmental organizations on the ground (both often funded by U.S. grants and assistance) to prevent and respond to outbreaks. Now, those partners are underfunded, underresourced and understaffed.
When local embassies were unable to absorb all the staffers affected by USAID’s abrupt closure, including specialists like clinical epidemiologists and virologists who prepared for emergencies like this, “those pieces aren’t there anymore,” said Kathleen Borgueta, who managed the East Africa portfolio for USAID’s global health bureau from 2020 to 2025 and spent most of her time in the now-affected region.
“The backbone of our workforce and our ability to respond just isn’t there anymore,” she told MS NOW, adding that the U.S. withdrawal also means systems previously supported by USAID are no longer at their peak capacity.
“What you really lost with USAID is logistics and ability to get s— done.”
Former USAID official
The latest Ebola strain, which has no vaccine or cure, is responsible for more than a thousand suspected and confirmed cases across the Congo and Uganda, with 223 suspected deaths and just 11 confirmed deaths, according to the WHO.
“I’ve heard from colleagues on the ground about specific things that we would have been doing that just haven’t been able to be mobilized at the speed or with the effectiveness that we normally would do,” Borgueta said. She cited getting protective gear where it’s needed, facilitating testing and ensuring samples are transferred at the correct temperature within the correct timelines.
A health worker first reported Ebola symptoms on April 24; the State Department said it was made aware of the outbreak on May 15. According to Congolese officials, the local lab in the Ituri province did not have proper equipment to test for the latest Bundibugyo Ebola strain, instead sending samples to Kinshasa at the incorrect temperature and quantity, which slowed the initial detection process.
“These are really specific, highly technical processes that we had really strong playbooks for,” Borgueta said, “and it’s just very clear from the way this is unfolding that those processes of playbooks and exercises, that we were really working to perfect to be able to respond to things in a matter of hours, have not been fully absorbed and have not been able to meet the need.”
The lag-time between the Congolese government and the WHO becoming aware of the outbreak was “really alarming” — and preventable — in the estimation of another former USAID official who had been working on health in the Congo and was granted anonymity for fear of professional retaliation.
The problem is administrative.
“What you really lost with USAID is logistics and ability to get s— done, the ability to pivot all of our health programs,” the former USAID official told MS NOW, noting the range and depth of USAID’s network. “We were the conveners, and we were the ones that everybody looked to … there’s just nobody on the ground in that way anymore, and we burned our credibility. Nobody’s calling us.”
The State Department has blamed the WHO for the scramble to get aid to the region, despite the fact that, as current and former officials observed, the WHO has no obligation to communicate with the United States since it withdrew from the organization.
“We were late to this because the WHO was a little late to this,” a senior State Department official said during a background press briefing. They said there have been no cuts to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention staff in the region and insisted “the surveillance network is what it always has been.”
While the U.S. still has a CDC network on the ground, the agency had several vacant positions when the outbreak began and nearly all of its staff worked out of the embassy in Kinshasa, on the opposite side of the country from North Kivu and the Ituri province where the outbreak first began.
“This area where this is happening right now is isolated, but also right near borders and a very high conflict area, and it’s a really hard place to get into, and you need to be operating there with people that are trusted by the community,” the former USAID official said. They said that although USAID’s health programs were not in the immediate area, the agency had partners on the ground who understood the local context.
“There was no specific person or program associated with USAID in this region that would have detected this or contributed to a detection framework here, so that’s just like a lie,” the senior State Department official said.
Julianne Weis, who worked for the United Nations during the 2014 Ebola outbreak and later in the global health bureau of USAID, said half of the clinics in North Kivu have closed due to USAID cuts.
“The way that we did outbreak response was by first supporting the primary health care system,” she said.
The State Department noted some Ebola-related USAID contracts continued within the government’s restructured foreign assistance bureau and that it hired some USAID staffers into the department. The most significant change, however, was the department’s investment in the America First Global Health Strategy’s memorandums of understanding, or MOUs, with individual countries, including the Congo and Uganda.
“I think we actually have a better, much better relationship with the health ministries there, who are the primary sort of public health authorities that have to respond to this and contain it for a long period of time,” the senior State Department official said. “It’s the national ministry that’s always going to be responsible for this, and the national health authorities that are going to have to fight this long after the NGO workers have taken their selfies and gone home.”
Weis was skeptical that the MOUs could make a significant difference at this stage, since moving money and implementing an actual plan as part of an agreement would take a significant amount of time.
“There’s no way to use that MOU to respond to this outbreak,” she said, calling the suggestion that NGO workers are there merely to take selfies “deeply disrespectful.”
“We always were working with governments,” she told MS NOW. “CDC again operated at a really high technical level, they do amazing work, but it’s that on-the-ground eyes and ears in the field — that was always USAID, and that’s what they took away.”
But the reality may be more complicated.








