The United States’ launch of a naval blockade against Iran on Monday marked the roll out of a new pressure tactic after both countries failed to come to an agreement to end the war after weekend negotiations. And just like the U.S.’s strategically fruitless air campaign against Iran, the new operation carries little upside and potentially large downsides. The most troubling disadvantage: A blockade could inadvertently draw new countries into the war.
As with every other stage of President Donald Trump’s war of aggression against Iran, the blockade’s sloppy implementation raised questions about its purpose and scope. Trump initially described it as covering the entire Strait of Hormuz, but the U.S. Central Command subsequently said the blockade would be enforced only against vessels entering and departing Iranian ports and coastal areas — which is a narrower blockade, since Iran is not the only country that has ports in the strait.
If Trump thinks this action involves no trade-offs, he is delusional.
While Trump initially said “other countries” would join the blockade, NATO allies have refused to participate, and Saudi Arabia is reportedly lobbying Trump to end it. Even the blockade’s effectiveness is unclear: tracking data shows multiple ships that departed from Iran passed through the strait after the blockade took effect, according to The New York Times. (The Times noted: “It was not immediately known whether the ships that had departed from Iranian ports fell within a ‘grace period’ around the deadline, had gained permission to pass or had somehow bypassed the blockade.”)
The most peculiar thing about Trump’s blockade is that he’s rolling it out during a ceasefire, which is meant to be a cessation of hostilities.
“While no one has said that the ceasefire is over, a blockade by itself is unambiguously an act of war under international law,” said Nicholas Mulder, a historian at Cornell University, who studies blockades and sanctions.
That means the ceasefire is now in a precarious gray area.
“This is an attempt by the Trump administration to really have it both ways: exert strong pressure with something that feels stronger and more muscular than ordinary sanctions, while not running the risk of the air campaign and potential ground forces deployment,” Mulder said.
Even after over a month of U.S. and Israeli bombing left Iran with control of the strait and the strategic upper hand, Trump seemingly believes that yet another round of escalation will bring Iran to heel. But it’s likely he is overestimating what a blockade can accomplish, and if Trump thinks this action involves no trade-offs, he is delusional.
The most obvious immediate cost of a blockade is that, coming atop Iran’s own near-closure of the strait, it puts additional pressure on energy prices. The blockade has already caused oil prices to surge and is putting huge pressure on the agricultural industry. According to Politico, “Economists and agriculture industry insiders say the supply chain backlog [for food production] could take years to fully recover.” Given that inflation was the biggest source of domestic political pressure on Trump even before the war, Trump’s new maneuver involves significant self-damage.
And while U.S. blockades have been somewhat effective at advancing the Trump administration’s goals in Cuba and Venezuela, Iran is not a comparable situation. The Iranian government has vowed to retaliate and has significant capacities to carry out that threat. It could again strike at energy infrastructure in Arab Gulf states. It could use missiles and drones against U.S. warships or other vessels. It could coordinate with Houthi allies in Yemen to close down the Bab el-Mandeb strait, cutting off the flow of Saudi oil from the Red Sea to global markets and pushing up oil prices even further.
But the riskiest aspect of the blockade may be its enforcement regarding third countries. Under international law, Mulder pointed out, the U.S. has an obligation to balance a belligerent’s right to blockade with the neutral right of free passage for countries that are not a party to the conflict. Oil and other goods out of the Strait of Hormuz are a critical lifeline for the economy of many Asian countries — and they are bound to insist on that freedom of navigation.
China, for instance, has already said access to its shipping lanes “must be guaranteed” and called the blockade “dangerous and irresponsible.” What happens when it insists on the right to leave and enter the strait and trade civilian goods with Iran?
The U.S.’s language suggests Chinese ships could be stopped by the U.S. Navy and possibly have their cargo seized.
How would China react to such a scenario? And what if China sent a military escort to accompany an oil tanker?
It has the makings of not just a major diplomatic incident, but an expanded war. The U.S. entered World War I because of Germany’s submarine campaign against U.S. shipping to Britain. It seems unlikely that one stand-off would draw a country like China into the war. But a series of incidents could quickly spiral out of control. Already it is possible that China sees Iran as an opportunity for proxy war — a U.S. official recently told MS NOW that China is preparing to send Iran new air defense systems in the coming weeks. (Beijing has denied it.)
Trump also has an option to avert any such incident by letting Chinese ships pass through without any interdiction — as it allowed a Russian oil tanker to arrive in Cuba. But how often can he do that without undermining the entire point of the blockade?
Trump yearns for a way to pressure Iran in a way that doesn’t involve costs, but no such options exist. His blockade hurts energy prices and involves an open-ended commitment of warships that could easily produce a new round of fighting. And managing the movement of powerful neutral countries requires tremendous finesse — something that Trump has shown himself to be incapable of. In his quest to avoid defeat, Trump is once again setting himself for an even bigger failure.
Zeeshan Aleem is a writer and editor for MS NOW. He primarily writes about politics and foreign policy.