Much has been made of the fact that only six uniformed officers and a few plainclothes officers were at the Utah Valley University event the day Charlie Kirk was fatally shot while speaking to a crowd on campus.
But in truth, doubling or even tripling that number would not have made a difference. Ticket checks and metal detectors can screen attendees in the immediate area, but they cannot defend against a sniper on a rooftop 175 yards away. Preventing that type of attack requires a countersniper team with specialized training and substantial resources. And even then, success is not guaranteed. The July 13, 2024, assassination attempt on Donald Trump demonstrated this reality: Despite the full capabilities of the Secret Service, the shooter still came within inches of a fatal shot.
Ticket checks and metal detectors can screen attendees in the immediate area, but they cannot defend against a sniper on a rooftop 175 yards away.
With more than 35 years as an FBI agent, a U.S. Marine, and now a security consultant, I can affirm that securing an outdoor event like the one where Kirk was killed is among the most difficult challenges in the field. A speaker positioned in low ground, surrounded by a large crowd and overlooked by two- to four-story buildings, creates vulnerabilities that no local police force can realistically control.
If Kirk had been my client, I would have wanted exactly that level of specialized team. But the cost is often far beyond what any private citizen or even many companies can afford. A more practical measure might have been a three-sided transparent ballistic panel capable of stopping a high-velocity rifle round like the .30-06 used in the attack on Kirk — which would not have provided total protection but could have offered a meaningful safeguard.
While we do not know the conversations or planning that went into this particular event, I have found in my years in the government and in consulting for high-risk security environments that clients themselves often reject such measures in the name of being approachable and standing among their supporters rather than behind visible barriers.
Effective security is always a balance between what works and what a client is willing to accept.
That tension is equally visible on the business side of security. For those critical of the security presence at the Utah Valley University event, it is important to understand that protection is expensive and produces no revenue, the critical consideration for most businesses. Its value is difficult to measure, as success often means nothing happens. How do you prove the success of an incident that was deterred?
Because of this, the field tends to operate in cycles. After a high-profile attack, interest surges. Calls come in with urgent requests. At first, money is said to be no object. A team is assembled quickly with travel, logistics and personnel costs reflecting the short notice, and a quote is provided. At that point, priorities often shift. Suddenly, budgets matter, and within days, as the sense of danger fades, the plan is abandoned. We found this to be the case in the aftermath of the targeted killing of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson, when many major companies clamored to hire security details for their leaders. That trend did not last. Too often, when confronted with the true cost of adequate protection, people settle for minimal coverage, such as a single driver with no advanced training, convincing themselves they have security now that the immediate threat appears to have faded.
Real security is neither simple nor convenient. It requires discipline like varying daily routes and schedules at random. It requires accepting protective measures that may not look appealing, such as ballistic panels or restricted access. And it requires trusting the expertise of trained professionals, even when their recommendations conflict with comfort or image. These are the trade-offs that genuinely protect lives.
We remain caught in the cycle of responding after tragedies rather than preventing them.
Kirk appeared on Wednesday in one of the most difficult environments to secure — outdoor college campuses. His team appeared to be better equipped for crowd management than dealing with a sniper threat. As is the case with nearly all deadly attacks, there was no way to perceive the particular nature of the threat he faced that day. The suspect, just 22 years old, most likely had little training, yet he is believed to have been able to not only plan and carry out the attack, but then escape afterward. That reality is sobering.
It is a horrifying reminder of how political violence in the United States is not receding; it is intensifying. Each successful incident not only causes immediate harm but also teaches future attackers what methods may succeed.
The hard truth is that no plan can guard against every possible threat. But security can be approached more seriously, with an understanding that its costs and inconveniences are investments (necessary ones, at that), not luxuries. When we fail to acknowledge that reality, we remain caught in the cycle of responding after tragedies rather than preventing them.