There is a shift happening amid the ongoing violence of the Israel-Hamas war. We can see this shift in President Joe Biden’s tone, even as he pledged his unwavering support for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. And we can see this shift in the way experts at the United Nations and other global organizations are cautioning their Israeli counterparts. The world is worried.
Israel’s desire to retaliate, deter and destroy Hamas in Gaza after the war crimes, hostage takings and atrocities committed on Oct. 7 is more than understandable. But Israelis are also smart and able to think through the consequences, including the unintended ones, of their actions. Netanyahu’s war Cabinet has been preparing for some kind of Gaza invasion for days now. But here’s the thing: The invasion doesn’t have to happen.
Netanyahu’s war Cabinet has been preparing for some kind of Gaza invasion for days now. But here’s the thing.
Americans know how overusing your military can be counterproductive, especially when it might involve large numbers of civilian noncombatants. We know what happened in Vietnam; we know what happened in Afghanistan. Israel has not yet made these same mistakes.
In a faint sign of hope, the Israeli military reportedly said on Tuesday that a Gaza ground offensive is “not a certainty.” That tempering of Israel’s militant tone may reflect private conversations Biden had with Netanyahu urging restraint, along the lines of what the president said publicly Wednesday: “While you feel that rage, don’t be consumed by it. After 9/11, we were enraged in the United States. And while we sought justice and got justice, we also made mistakes."
And that means Israel has a big opportunity. It can refuse to walk into the trap that Hamas has set. And it can instead pursue a far more strategic approach — destroying Hamas from within, as well as from without.
Israel’s intelligence services suffered a “colossal failure,” according to Bruce Hoffman, a senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security at the Council on Foreign Relations. Now, Israel needs to repair and bolster its anti-terror networks, not further erode them. A pullback could preserve potential sources of “humint” — human intelligence that will help ensure Hamas can never again mount an attack of this scope.
In the meantime, leave your enemy wondering when, where and how you will strike.
Israel standing strong in place and not invading would avoid falling prey to Hamas’ jiu jitsu — using Israel’s own weight against it. A regional conflagration is exceedingly risky. Iran could engage, either directly or indirectly via proxies like Hezbollah. Hamas welcomes global chaos, no matter who gets hurt as a result.
There is no shame in leaving its IDF forces massed around Gaza without escalating further. Doing so could give the army and intelligence forces more time to locate and possibly exchange the hostages without massive IDF or hostage casualties.
At present, there seems to be no plan for "the day after the day after."
Such a pause also gives both Israelis and Palestinians more time to think through how to fill the potential vacuum that will be left if Israel ultimately succeeds in destroying Hamas. At present, there seems to be no plan for "the day after the day after." While Hamas is famous for its militant wing, it also provides social services and "governs" Gaza, even though there have not been democratic elections in the region for over a decade.
Israel has tried before to govern Gaza, leaving in 2005 because, as then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said two years earlier, “It is not possible to continue holding 3.5 million people under occupation.” Having no end game now is the sinkhole into which Israel also fell in the 1980s when, to its own regret it invaded Lebanon, just like America’s tragic experiences in Afghanistan and Vietnam.
And then there’s Israel’s domestic front.
Netanyahu’s “judicial reform” catastrophe may have also convinced Hamas that now was a good time to strike, when internal division was high, according to former U.S. Adm. James Stavridis. By resolving these internal crises while simultaneously pursuing intelligence in Gaza and internationally, Israel would strengthen its national security apparatus. To think one’s problems can be solved by a knee-jerk, indiscriminate retaliation is to be held hostage by one’s own belief in military might.
The story of military powers’ arrogance is timeless, particularly for great powers invading “lesser” territories where Indigenous resistors inevitably know the lay of the land far better. History offers maps around quagmires, but they are available only to those who are humble enough to read them.