At a time when NATO faces perhaps its greatest challenge, the question of its so-called “expansion” at the end of the Cold War remains very much alive. The two matters are, in fact, closely entwined. NATO’s enemies — both in Russia and now, sadly, in and around the White House — continue to deploy spurious arguments to weaken the alliance and justify Vladimir Putin’s brazen war of aggression against Ukraine.
The flawed argument about NATO expansion flows from two false premises. One is that in February 1990, when then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker uttered the words “not one inch eastward,” he allegedly “promised” Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that the American-led defense alliance would not enlarge.
The flawed argument about NATO expansion flows from two false premises.
Many of those who have latched on to this phrase are oblivious to the context. Baker and Gorbachev were discussing German reunification, not central and Eastern European security. At the time, Baker made no hard and fast promises, for these were exploratory talks to test ideas, and both sides vowed to speak more in the future. Nor, as secretary of state, was Baker in a position to promise anything. The president needed to sign off on any pledge.
Crucially, President George H.W. Bush never used the “not one inch” phrase. Instead, he spoke about the “special status” of East German territory, which would have to be negotiated (for this was seven months before the details were enshrined in the “Two Plus Four” treaty settling the German question).
While the diplomatic reality of 1990 was complicated, the unscrupulous political use of these discussions has been quite simple. Putin has repeatedly deployed the false notion of the West’s “broken promises” in his propaganda campaign as he seeks to reclaim the Soviet sphere of influence lost at the end of the Cold War. For him, the “not one inch” phrase is a useful tool as he seeks to push NATO back to its 1997 borders while justifying his military actions and own revanchism and revisionism.
Unfortunately, Putin has also found useful idiots in the West, willing to aid and abet his nefarious campaign.
The second flawed premise about the 1990s is based on the belief that America was in some way the aggressor — that Washington used NATO to expand America’s own influence while looking to humiliate and directly threaten the Russian Federation in the process.
What this argument totally ignores is the agency of European states. After 1991, those in central and Eastern Europe especially benefited from NATO’s “open door” policy, effectively in existence since 1949, for it is based on Article 10 of the founding treaty.
Unfortunately, Putin has also found useful idiots in the West, willing to aid and abet his nefarious campaign.
What’s more, according to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, as sovereign states these European countries also have the right to freely choose whether to join any alliance — a right that Moscow acknowledged when it signed the act. The ex-Soviet satellite states and the Baltic states utilized these opportunities, in large part, because they had never wanted to be part of Stalin’s “empire by imposition” symbolized by the Warsaw Pact. They also feared that as soon as Russia recovered from its economic collapse and postcolonial trauma, it would expand again.
These concerns were met by significant skepticism. In the 1990s, Washington (and other capitals) were still gripped by hopes for a “commonwealth of nations” and a “better” post-Berlin Wall world.
Yet ultimately, Russia’s democracy was stillborn. Already under President Boris Yeltsin, ultranationalism, authoritarianism and talk of the “near abroad” and “russkii mir” raised the specter of Russian neo-imperialism. After Putin arrived at the Kremlin, Russian ambitions — and Eastern European fears — eventually came true.
When Putin sent his troops into Ukraine in 2022, his goal was to wipe the country from the map. In response, Finland and Sweden quickly applied to join the NATO club, abandoning their traditional commitment to neutrality or military nonalignment in the process. By 2024, they too had entered the alliance through its open door.
In short, then, NATO “expansion” has been driven not so much by Washington’s imperial impulse. Rather, it has been a reaction to a shared European perception that Moscow remains a clear and present danger to its security.
This remains the situation today. Despite headlines that fluctuate by the hour, two fundamental developments are clear.
When Putin sent his troops into Ukraine in 2022, his goal was to wipe the country from the map.
On the one hand, Putin does not tolerate the concept of “sovereign equality” of states. It is one of the fundamental principles of the liberal international order that he has declared obsolete. Putin (like China’s President Xi Jinping and, apparently, America’s President Donald Trump) believes in only strong states — Russia, China, the U.S. — being “truly sovereign.” Small states have no status. That is a main reason why he is so keen to talk bilaterally with Trump, ignoring Ukraine (and America’s European allies). Putin’s maxim is clear. Those not at the table are on the menu — and can potentially be eaten alive.
On the other, the erratic Trump has eroded — and perhaps even already destroyed — Europe’s faith in America’s reliability. Nor does America seem prepared to pursue a Rooseveltian view of Western security. In this view, which has largely held sway in Washington since the 1940s, cooperation and interdependence with Europe are in the U.S. national interest. The trans-Atlantic alliance is more than just an operative defense club under the American nuclear umbrella, but an organization based on genuine friendship. And both America and Europe share a common belief in order, stability, the rule of law and democracy.
All these key pillars of the cohesive postwar West were intended to secure long-term peace and prosperity. With their rapid crumbling, France’s Emmanuel Macron, the U.K.’s Keir Starmer and Germany’s Friedrich Merz — together with the rest of Europe — are not only heavily investing in their own defense and deterrence capabilities. They are also insisting on the vital relevance of this rules-based order.
Indeed, Europe is fortunately rising to the challenge. Its leaders would prefer America to be an active and reliable partner. The invitation these countries extended in the late 1940s for Washington to lead a consensual empire still exists. Yet the leaders of these countries remain doubtful about America’s desire to stay at the party. While hoping for the best, they are therefore preparing for the worst. Which is a world where a distant, volatile and bullying America is no longer dependable, while a looming, brutalized and calculating Russia poses an ever-greater threat, not only symbolized by its direct military aggression in Ukraine, but also through its conduct of nonlinear and distinctly political warfare.
Russian hybrid warfare is already an established fact. And the Kremlin’s continuous and erroneous claims of NATO’s wrongful expansion is merely one key prong in this political conflict. Besides the destruction of Ukraine, what Putin wants is to drive the Euro-Atlantic community apart — and to see it wrecked. Europeans are determined not to let this happen. What America really wants remains to be seen.