Watching the Trump administration’s so-called “Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)” bulldoze through government institutions, I cannot help but be reminded of the Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG), a pivotal organization in the early years of China’s Cultural Revolution from 1966-1976.
I was three years old when the Cultural Revolution was launched by the Chinese Communist Party’s paramount leader Mao Zedong. At the time, many of Mao’s comrades in the top leadership ranks had challenged his power and authority due to his string of disastrous and deadly policy failures (including the Great Leap Forward and the Great Famine). Mao aimed to pull them down through the Cultural Revolution by inciting the masses to rebel against them.
Having lived in both systems, I believe there are valuable lessons to draw from this comparison to preserve America’s constitutional democracy.
Established in May 1966 by Mao, the CCRG surpassed the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo in power and became a ferocious instrument of Mao’s political agenda aimed to purge “bourgeois” elements, reshape Chinese government and society, and consolidate Mao’s authority. While it may seem like a stretch to compare President Trump’s DOGE with Chairman Mao’s CCRG due to their vastly different political foundations, having lived in both systems, I believe there are valuable lessons to draw from this comparison to preserve America’s constitutional democracy.
DOGE and the CCRG share striking parallels as unconventional entities wielding immense power, disrupting established systems and leaving lasting impacts. Both represent populist-authoritarian experiments that bypassed formal legal frameworks, operated with significant public support, and targeted entrenched bureaucracies. However, their contexts, methods, and consequences differ in ways that highlight the resilience — or lack thereof — of constitutional governance.
Both DOGE and the CCRG emerged as tools for populist authoritarian leaders — Donald Trump in the U.S. and Mao Zedong in China — seeking to reshape government and consolidate power outside traditional legal frameworks. DOGE was not established by Congress but by presidential fiat under Donald Trump, while the CCRG replaced existing party structures to serve Mao’s vision. Neither adhered to constitutional norms or institutional checks, relying instead on the charisma and authority of their leaders.
DOGE has gained access to critical U.S. government systems, including Treasury payment platforms managing trillions of dollars annually, while dismantling agencies like USAID. Similarly, the CCRG became the de facto top authority in China during the early years of the Cultural Revolution, sidelining even the Politburo Standing Committee. Both entities operated with sweeping mandates to reshape governance with little regard for law or traditional political norms.
Elon Musk framed DOGE’s mission as a fight against “the tyranny of bureaucracy,” resonating with voters frustrated by inefficiency. Similarly, Mao’s CCRG mobilized millions through slogans like “Smash the Four Olds” and “Down with the capitalist roaders inside the party,” targeting intellectuals, officials and traditional elites perceived as obstacles to revolutionary progress. During this period, all major decisions required CCRG approval. It controlled access to Mao’s directives and sidelined other CCP leaders who opposed or questioned its radical agenda. In both cases, these populist narratives initially garnered significant public support.
The CCRG’s radical policies led to mass violence, economic collapse and millions of deaths during the Cultural Revolution. While DOGE has not caused such human suffering, its undermining of federal agencies risks long-term damage to U.S. governance by weakening regulatory frameworks and fostering cronyism. Both experiments exemplify how unchecked power can destabilize political systems.
Despite DOGE’s overreach, the U.S. retains a functioning legal system capable of imposing limits on Musk’s actions. Congressional investigations and media scrutiny have raised alarms about DOGE’s legality and ethical implications. In contrast, Mao’s China lacked such institutional safeguards; dissent was brutally suppressed through imprisonment and killings, enabling unchecked radicalism.
DOGE has run roughshod over laws, judges, government employees and lawmakers. This intertwining of wealth and power undermines democratic norms.
My father was a local party chief at the time the CCRG ascended. Like millions of other CCP officials whom Mao no longer trusted, my father was targeted and assaulted by rebels mobilized by Mao. I was sitting in my house when I looked out the window and witnessed a group of men savagely punching and kicking my father for what seemed like an eternity. They beat him mercilessly, but apparently not to kill him, because he was still breathing when they hauled him away in their cart to a countryside detention camp. This was my first memory of terror in my life.
When the CCRG had completed its task of fetching chestnuts from the fire for Mao — bringing down his political enemies and punishing disloyal bureaucrats — it lost its value to him. The political chaos it created, along with its members’ corruption and vicious persecution, provoked resentment from both the public and bureaucrats, ultimately threatening Mao’s authority. The CCRG quickly fell out of favor; most of its members sooner or later became victims of political struggles and were imprisoned even as despised enemies of the people.
Elon Musk has faced criticism for extraordinary conflicts of interest as his private enterprises benefit from his government role. DOGE has run roughshod over laws, judges, government employees and lawmakers. This intertwining of wealth and power undermines democratic norms but remains subject to potential legal accountability.
The CCRG is remembered as one of modern Chinese history’s most radical governing bodies. Its policies caused immense suffering and left deep scars on Chinese society. While it succeeded in consolidating Mao’s authority during his lifetime, its actions ultimately discredited his legacy and led to significant reforms under Deng Xiaoping after 1978. Even today, it serves as a cautionary tale about unchecked power wielded by ideologically driven leaders operating outside established legal frameworks.
The CCRG’s eventual downfall offers a warning for the DOGE. Mao dissolved the group when its radicalism became untenable even within his regime. Similarly, DOGE may face growing resistance from Congress, courts, or public opinion as its overreach becomes increasingly apparent. While America’s legal system provides mechanisms for accountability absent in Maoist China, these institutions must act decisively to prevent long-term damage.
Both DOGE and the CCRG illustrate how populist-authoritarian experiments exploit public discontent to amass power while bypassing institutional safeguards. However, their differing contexts underscore the importance of rule of law in containing such threats. The U.S.’s ability to check the DOGE will determine whether it becomes a disruptive footnote or a harbinger of deeper democratic decay.